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Abstract 
The European Union has established a comprehensive and successful judicial cooperation 
framework that applies between EU Member States to facilitate cross-border relationships. This 
framework harmonizes and simplifies the rules in ascertaining the applicable law and competent 
court in cross-border disputes, and enables judgments rendered by the courts of one Member 
States to be recognized and enforced in other EU Member States.  
The 2016 EU referendum resulted in the UK triggering Article 50 TEU to exit the EU by the end 
of March 2019 (Brexit). Upon Brexit and without special arrangements, relevant EU judicial 
cooperation instruments, in principle, would stop being effective in the UK. This article 
examines the potential consequence of Brexit and explores the possibilities for post-Brexit 
judicial cooperation between the UK and EU. After analysing the five potential models, this 
article proposes that the optimal model is for the UK and EU to enter into a special arrangement 
based on the existing EU judicial cooperation law and the UK should follow the CJEU 
judgments as closely as possible with diversion in exceptional circumstances. If this model is not 
achievable, the UK could transpose the unilateral applicable EU private international law into its 
domestic law and at the same time ratify relevant international conventions to re-shape the post-
Brexit judicial cooperation with the EU.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On 23 June 2016, the EU referendum took place in the UK, with majority of those who voted 
voting in favour of leaving the EU.1 Following the UK Supreme Court’s ruling in R (Miller) v 
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Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union,2 the UK parliament approved the European 
Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017,3 which empowered the Prime Minister to trigger 
the Brexit process. The UK government invoked the formal withdrawing process, i.e. Article 50 
of the Lisbon Treaty, on 29 March 2017, which results in the UK leaving the EU by the end of 
March 2019.  
Brexit will undoubtedly affect EU and UK citizens and companies, especially those engaging in 
cross-border activities. European integration increases cross-border relationships between 
individuals and companies from different EU Member States. The increasing cross-border 
relationship leads to cross-border disputes. In the absence of the unified substantive law and 
court system, companies and citizens would face uncertainty and obstacles to predict the legal 
consequence of their cross-border activities, to access to justice or seek redress and to enforce 
their rights overseas. In order to facilitate cross-border relations in the internal market, the EU 
has established a comprehensive judicial cooperation system, which harmonises and simplifies 
the rules in ascertaining the applicable law and competent court, and enables judgments rendered 
by the courts of one Member States to be recognised and enforced in other EU Member States. 
Being in force for the past few decades, the EU civil judicial cooperation system is considered by 
most commentators as effective and successful,4 which provides certainty, predictability and 
efficiency to EU (including UK) citizens and companies engaged in cross-border civil and 
commercial matters in the internal market.5 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 The full title is ‘the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum’, which is also known as the EU 
referendum and the Brexit referendum. The result is 17,410,742 (51.89%) in favour of leave and 16,141,241 
(48.11%) remain.  
2 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Existing the European Union [2017] UKSC 5.  
3  European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 (c. 9). 
4 Ministry of Justice, ‘Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union: Civil Judicial Cooperation’, Feb. 2014, https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/balance-of-
competences/results/civil-judicial-cooperation-report-review-of-balance-of-competences.pdf (accessed on 12 Oct 
2017); House of Lords, ‘Brexit: Justice for Families, Individuals and Businesses?’, 17th HL paper 134, 20 March 
2017, https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/134/134.pdf (accessed on 4 July 2017), 
paras 26-38. 
5 M Pfeiffer, ‘Legal Certainty and Predictability in International Succession Law’, (2016) 12 Journal of Private 
International Law 566; M Danov and P Beaumont, ‘Measuring the Effectiveness of the EU Civil Justice 
Framework’, (2015-16) XVII Yearbook of Private International Law 151; S.C. Symeonides, ‘Codification and 
Flexibility in Private International Law’, in K.B. Brown and D.V. Snyder (eds), General Reports of the XVIIIth 
Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law (Springer, 2012) 167; A. Fiorini, ‘The Codification of 
Private International Law in Europe’, (2008) 12 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 1.  
  
The EU civil judicial cooperation system has largely influenced the UK. The past 35 years or so 
have witnessed the gradual Europeanisation of UK private international law. 6  The EU has 
harmonised and codified private international law in cross-border civil and commercial 
jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments,7  applicable law in contractual and 
non-contractual obligations,8 jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in cross-
border matrimonial matters,9 jurisdiction, applicable law and recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in maintenance obligations,10cross-border insolvency proceedings,11taking evidence 
abroad,12 and service of proceedings abroad.13 Traditional English private international law only 
applies in limited circumstances falling out of the scope of the EU harmonization.14 EU rules 
have been applied in the English courts over the past four decades and have guided companies 
and practitioners to shape their contract and business strategy. Brexit will undoubtedly lead to 
uncertainty. Upon Brexit and without special arrangements, relevant EU judicial cooperation 
instruments, in principle, would stop being effective in the UK.15 What would be the future civil 
judicial cooperation framework between the UK and the EU? Would the UK be treated as an 
                                                          
6 A Dickinson, ‘Back to the future’, (2016) 12 Journal of Private International Law 195, 196; P.S. Morris, ‘The 
modern transplantation of continental law in England’, (2016) 12 Journal of Private International Law 587, 587ff; J 
Harris, ‘Understanding the English Response to the Europeanization of Private International Law’, (2008) 4 Journal 
of Private International Law 347. 
7 Regulation (EC) No. 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matter (recast), [2012] OJ L351/1. 
8 Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), [2008] OJ L177/6; 
Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), [2007] OJ L199/40. 
9 Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, [2003] OJ L338/1. 
10  Regulation (EC) No. 4/2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and 
cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, [2009] OJ L7/1. 
11 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings (Recast), [2015] OJ L 141/19. 
12 Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence 
in civil or commercial matters, [2001] OJ L174/1. 
13 Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in 
civil or commercial matters, [2007] OJ L324/79. 
14For example, traditional English law is applied to determine jurisdiction where the defendant is domiciled out of 
the EU, domicile of a natural person, applicable law in bills of exchange or other negotiable instruments, applicable 
law to agency relationship, applicable law to defamation and violation of privacy, applicable law on divorce (UK 
does not opt in the Regulation 1259/2010) and cross-border succession (UK did not opt in to Regulation No 
650/2012). 
15 For more discussion on this point, see Sara Masters, Belinda McRae, ‘What does Brexit Mean for the Brussels 
Regime?’, (2016) 33 Journal of International Arbitration 483, 492; Dickinson,  n 8, 200-205; R. Aikens and A. 
Dinsmore, ‘Jurisdiction, Enforcement and the Conflict of Laws in Cross-Border Commercial Disputes: What are the 
Legal Consequences of Brexit’, (2016) 27 European Business Law Review 903; J Fitchen, ‘The PIL consequences 
of Brexit’, (2017) 3 NIPR 411, 423.  
  
ordinary third country by the other EU Member States post-Brexit? Would it be possible to 
maintain the existing judicial cooperation scheme between the UK and EU?  
This article provides analysis of five potential models, i.e. the transposition model, multilateral 
model, bilateral model, unilateral model and international model, which may be relied on to 
shape the future judicial cooperation between the UK and EU. This analysis reveals that the 
optimal choice is for the UK and the EU to enter into a special agreement on civil judicial 
cooperation that incorporates the current EU private international law rules. This agreement will 
provide the most pragmatic benefits at least for the short term post-Brexit. If such an agreement 
cannot be reached because of disagreement on the CJEU jurisdiction, the UK could transpose 
existing EU law into UK domestic law and, at the same time, ratify international judicial 
cooperation conventions, which could provide a reliable alternative and may be a more 
politically sensible and realistic solution for the long-term.  
 
II. TRANSPOSITION MODEL  
The transposition model suggests the UK transposes EU law into UK domestic law.16 On 2 
October 2016, the Prime Minister of the UK, Theresa May, announced the intention to repeal the 
European Communities Act 1972 with a ‘Great Repeal Bill’. 17  The UK Government later 
published a White Paper, conforming the general position to adopt the transposition model.18 
This will end the EU legislative competence in the UK, as well as the authority of the CJEU in 
interpreting the law applying in the UK. The UK Parliament then published the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill, which passed its Second Reading on 11 September 2017.19 The Great Repeal 
Bill will convert the ‘body of existing EU law’ into UK law on the exit date to keep existing 
certainty for UK citizens and businesses, and the future amendment, repeal and improvement of 
                                                          
16 There are three systems of private international law in the UK – England and Wales, Northern Ireland and 
Scotland.  It is for the Scottish Parliament to legislate on issues within the sphere of private international law rather 
than the UK Parliament. From the perspective of competency, if the transposition model is adopted by the UK 
Parliament, a legislative consent motion is needed in the Scottish Parliament. 
17 ‘Theresa May’s Conservative conference speech on Brexit’, Politics Home, 2 Oct 2016. 
18 HM Government, Department for Exiting the EU, ‘Legislating for the United Kingdom’s Withdrawal From the 
European Union’ (White Paper), March 2017. 
19  For more information on the EU (Withdrawal Bill) or the ‘Great Repeal Bill’, see 
https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/europeanunionwithdrawal.html (accessed on 25 Oct 2017). 
  
these laws would be subject to full legislative process and Parliamentary debate.20 The body of 
existing EU law, or the Acquis Communautaire, constitutes existing EU treaties, Regulations, 
Directives, and CJEU case law.21 In the area of civil judicial cooperation, all the EU judicial 
cooperation instruments that are currently effective in the UK will be transposed into the UK law 
to avoid the ‘black hole’ caused by Brexit. 
The transposition model may work for unilaterally applicable rules, such as choice of law rules 
in Rome I and Rome II but it would encounter an inevitable challenge in the area of judicial 
cooperation, which is largely based on mutual trust and reciprocity. In other words, the proper 
functioning and operation of the judicial cooperation system requires the continuous interaction 
between the UK and other EU Member States.  
The importance of reciprocity is demonstrated by three examples. The first and most typical 
example is recognition and enforcement of judgments.22 The greatest achievement of the current 
EU judicial cooperation is to enable civil and commercial judgments made by the court of one 
Member State to be freely circulated in other Member States, with very efficient, speedy and 
simplified procedure,23 limited refusal grounds24 and minimal review.25 The judgment regime 
largely resolved the traditional difficulty in international commercial litigation caused by the 
great uncertainty, cost or even impossibility to enforce judgments abroad.26 The transposition 
                                                          
20Ibid. 
21  The UK Parliament, European Union (Withdrawal Bill) Explanatory Notes, 8, 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2017-2019/0005/en/18005en.pdf (accessed on 24 Oct 2017). 
22  For discussion on EU enforcement of judgments rules, see M Kilinsky, ‘Mutual trust and cross-border 
enforcement of judgments in civil matters in the EU’, (2017) 64(1) Netherlands International Law Review 115; 
Ugljesa Grusic, ‘Recognition and enforcement of judgments in employment matters in EU private international 
law’, (2016) 12 Journal of Private International Law 521; Samuel P. Baumgartner, ‘Recent Reforms in EU Law’ 
(2014) 97(4) Judicature 188. 
23 The Brussels I Recast accelerates recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments between Member States by 
abolishing exequatur. Foreign judgments can be recognised without any special procedure under Art 36.  
24 Refusal may only be granted under four grounds under Article 45 and these grounds are interpreted restrictively 
by the CJEU. See, e.g., restrictive interpretation of public policy defence, Case C-414/92 Solo Kleinmotoren v Boch 
[1994] ECR I-2237; Case C-145/86 Hoffmann v Krieg [1988] ECR 645; Case C-7/98 Kromback v Bamberski [2000] 
ECR I-1935.  
25 The requested court cannot review the merits of the judgment (Art 52) and can only review the jurisdiction of the 
original court in cases involving an exclusive jurisdiction under Article 24 or in some consumer, insurance and 
employment cases (Art 45(2) and (3)). 
26A Feldman, ‘Rethinking Review of Foreign Court Jurisdiction in Light of the Hague Judgments Negotiations’, 
(2014) 89 New York University Law Review 2190, 2192; R.W. Hulbert, ‘Some Thoughts on Judgments, 
Reciprocity, and the Seeming Paradox of International Commercial Arbitration’, (2008) 29 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 641, 
641.  
  
model, however, could not preserve the advantage provided by the free movement of judgments, 
which completely depends on the mutual trust and reciprocity. The UK could maintain the 
obligation to enforce judgments made by other Member States after transposing the current EU 
law into its domestic law. It, however, could not demand other Member States to exercise the 
equal respect towards the UK judgments post-Brexit, which would then be classified as 
judgments rendered in a third country. 
The second example is the doctrine of lis pendens, which prevents concurrent proceedings on the 
same or related actions from being brought in the courts of more than one Member State.27 
Concurrent proceedings will increase public and private costs and lead to irreconcilable 
judgments which may cause enforcement difficulties. Therefore, Article 29(1) of the Brussels I 
Recast requests the second seised court to stay jurisdiction in favour of the first seised court in 
the same cause of action between the same parties, and Article 30(1) of the Regulation provides 
the second seised court ‘may’ stay jurisdiction in favour of the first seised court in the ‘related 
action’ under its discretion, considering how closely the two actions are linked, how far the first 
action is in progress, and how likely it is that the two actions may result in irreconcilable 
judgments. 28  Similar lis pendens rules are also provided in the Maintenance Regulation. 29 
Besides, Brussels II bis also demands the second seised court to stay jurisdiction in proceedings 
relating to divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment between the same parties, 30 and 
parental responsibility relating to the same child and involving the same cause of action.31 The 
operation of the lis pendens rule depends on the second seised court voluntarily respecting the 
jurisdiction of the first seised court of a Member State. Since it requires the court to restrain its 
own jurisdiction based on the first-come-first-served standard, it usually can only work 
                                                          
27Art 29-35 of the Brussels I Recast; Art 12 and 13 of the Maintenance Regulation; Art 19 of the Brussels II bis. For 
more discussion on lis pendens, see J Vlek, ‘Lis pendens, choice of court agreements and abuse of law under 
Brussels I bis’, (2016) 63(3) Netherlands International Law Review 297; C Bradley, ‘The lis pendens rules under 
Brussels II a’, (2016) 46 Family Law 471; Vesna Lazic, ‘The Revised Lis Pendens Rule in the Brussels Jurisdiction 
Regulation’ (2013) 15 Review of European Law 5. 
28AG Opinion in Case C-129/92 Owens Bank v Bracco (No 2) [1994] ECR I-117. 
29 Art 12 and 13 of the Maintenance Regulation. 
30 Article 19(1) of the Brussels II bis. 
31 Article 19(2) of the Brussels II bis. 
  
effectively between countries with established obligations and reciprocity. 32  After the UK 
withdraws from the EU, the UK is no longer a ‘Member State’. It means that the EU Member 
States no longer have the Regulation obligation to respect the judicial proceedings of the UK, 
even if the UK is the first seised court. The only provisions that are relevant in this scenario are 
Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels I Recast, which provide discretionary lis pendens rules in 
relation to the concurrent proceedings pending in the EU court and the court of a third country.33 
It suggests that the court of an EU Member State has the discretion to stay jurisdiction in favour 
of a third country.34 Articles 33 and 34 aim to improve the functioning of the Regulation in the 
international legal order by avoiding parallel proceedings in and out of the EU.35 They were 
designed to reduce the risk of conflicting judgments between the courts of the EU and third 
countries, and they also show respect for proceeding of non-EU countries, especially when it is 
well advanced. This level of discretion, however, cannot provide the equal protection and respect 
to the UK proceedings after Brexit. Firstly, compulsory lis pendens applied to the concurrent 
proceedings between Member States would not apply to the proceedings between a Member 
State and a third country, even if the two proceedings concern the same cause of action between 
the same parties.36 Secondly, discretion will only be made to stay jurisdiction if a third country 
judgment is capable of being recognised and enforced in the Member State, and a stay is 
necessary for the proper administration of justice.37 It is unclear when it would be considered 
‘necessary for the proper administration of justice’ to stay jurisdiction in favour of a third 
country.38 A very general guidance is provided which suggests assessing ‘all the circumstances 
of the case’. 39 Consideration should also be given to the comparative appropriateness of the 
forum, such as the nexus and proximity between the dispute and the parties and the forum and 
the stage of progress of the proceedings in the third country, and the efficiency of trial, such as 
                                                          
32It is necessary to note that usually no one country would unilaterally adopt the lis pendens rule in favour of other 
countries in the world, given the fact that it cannot guarantee other countries would adopt the same rule in favour of 
it.  
33 For comments on these new provisions, see Ivan Ovchinnikov, ‘Owusu, Lis Pendens and the Recent Recast of the 
Brussels I Regulation’ (2016) 19 Trinity College Law Review 40; Koji Takahashi, ‘Review of the Brussels I 
Regulation’ (2012) 8(1) Journal of Private International Law 1. 
34 Art 33(1) and 34(1). 
35 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters’, COM(2010) 0748 final.  
36 Art 33(1). 
37Art 33(1)(a) and (b); Art 34(1)(b) and (c). 
38 Art 33(1)(b) and Art 34(1)(c). 
39 Recital 24 of the Brussels I Recast. 
  
the reasonable timeframe for the third country to deliver the judgment.40 Furthermore, the court 
of a Member State could resume jurisdiction at any time, even after jurisdiction is stayed under 
lis pendens initially.41 The decision to continue may be made if the court of the Member State 
considers the proceedings in the court of the UK are unlikely to be concluded in a reasonable 
time, or it is required for the proper administration of justice to do so.42 Arguably, the new EU 
provisions allow EU courts to engage in a forum non conveniens style of analysis to decline 
jurisdiction in favour of a more appropriate non-EU forum, 43  which may assist better 
administration of justice and efficient trial. However, Articles 33 and 34 are likely to cause 
uncertainty as to how these factors are ascertained and whether EU Member States would apply 
them consistently. Particular difficulties also exist because the courts of many EU Member States 
do not have the tradition of exercising discretion at this level and some courts do not provide 
detailed justification for judgments. One would question the quality of implementation of these 
provisions and therefore the granting of sufficient protection to  UK proceedings after Brexit.  
The third example is enforcement of choice of court agreements. The Brussels I Recast, Brussels 
II bis and Maintenance Regulation permit parties to enter into agreements to choose the 
competent court to resolve their disputes.44 An exclusive jurisdiction clause usually has both 
prorogation and derogation effects in that firstly, the chosen court should take jurisdiction; and 
secondly, the non-chosen courts of other Member States should decline jurisdiction. In order to 
protect jurisdiction of the chosen court, Article 31(2) of the Brussels I Recast provides that 
‘where a court of a Member State on which an agreement … confers exclusive jurisdiction is 
seised, any courts of another Member State shall stay the proceedings until such time as the court 
seised on the basis of the agreement declares that it has no jurisdiction under the agreement.’45 It 
further provides that ‘(w)here the court designated in the agreement has established jurisdiction 
in accordance with the agreement, any court of another Member State shall decline jurisdiction 
                                                          
40 ibid.  
41Art 33(2) and 34(2). 
42Art 33(2)(b) and (c); Art 34(2)(c) and (d). 
43 The difference is that the common law forum non conveniens in the UK permits the court to decline jurisdiction 
even if it is the first seised court while the EU Regulation only allows the second seised EU court to decline 
jurisdiction.  
44 Brussels I Recast, Art 25; Brussels II bis, Art 12; Maintenance Regulation, Art 4. 
45Art 31(2). 
  
in favour of that court.’46 It is true that these provisions are not perfect. For example, the Brussels 
I Recast does not provide the chosen court exclusive jurisdiction to assess the validity of the 
jurisdiction clause and the obligation to stay jurisdiction only arises if the chosen court in a 
Member State is also seised.47 However, in practice, the other party wishing to rely on the 
exclusive jurisdiction clause usually would bring the proceedings in the chosen forum without 
delay. The Brussels I Recast at least establishes the hierarchy between the courts of Member 
States and grants the chosen court priority. Where the commercial parties conclude an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause in their contracts, they acquire certainty that such an agreement will be 
enforced and no other courts usually will take jurisdiction.48  
It is true that the UK court may, under the transposition model, continue to enforce agreements 
choosing the courts of the UK by taking jurisdiction. However, the transposition model cannot 
impose the obligation for the courts of the EU Member States to stay jurisdiction in favour of the 
chosen court of a third country. Unless there are other treaty obligations in place, the opposing 
party may bring the action subject to the UK jurisdiction clause to the court of an EU Member 
State, which may nevertheless take jurisdiction.49 An exclusive jurisdiction clause choosing UK 
courts no longer provides the same level of certainty that the commercial parties could acquire 
under the Brussels I Recast. It could result in concurrent proceedings and conflicting judgments 
that seriously undermine the purpose of jurisdiction clauses. Furthermore, the concurrent 
proceedings may result in irreconcilable judgments. The enforcement of a UK judgment is 
potentially made more difficult by the fact that the UK would no longer be a member of the EU 
judgment scheme. On the other hand, the judgment of the EU Member State may acquire the free 
circulation in the EU even if the court is not chosen by the parties and jurisdiction is wrongly 
                                                          
46Art 31(3). 
47 ZS Tang, ‘Cross-border Contract Litigation in the EU’, in P Beaumont, M Danov, et al., (eds), Cross-Border 
Litigation in Europe (Hart, 2017) 623, 626-7; T Hartley, ‘Choice-of-court Agreements and the New Brussels I 
Regulation’, (2013) 129 Law Quarterly Review 309, 309-11. 
48  This rule is welcomed by most commentators. See Lukasz Gorywoda, ‘The New Design of the Brussels I 
Regulation’ (2013) 19 Columbia Journal of European Law Online Supplement 1; Delia Ferri, ‘An End to Abusive 
Litigation Tactics within the EU’ (2013) 1 Irish Business Law Review 21; David Kenny, Rosemary Hennigan, 
‘Choice-of-Court Agreements, the Italian Torpedo, and the Recast of the Brussels I Regulation’ (2015) 64 ICLQ 
197; Ian Bergson, ‘The Death of the Torpedo Action’ (2015) 11 J. PrivIntL 1. 
49 In reality, it is estimated that the UK will ratify the Hague Choice of Court Convention anyway upon Brexit and 
this Convention creates treaty obligations for the EU Member States and the UK with limited exceptions. This will 
be discussed in the paragraph that follows. 
  
taken.50 This would result in weakening the effect of a UK jurisdiction clause, in contrast to 
jurisdiction clauses choosing the courts of other EU Member States, 51  and could affect the 
popularity of London as an international centre for commercial dispute resolution.52 According 
to a study conducted by the BIICL, factors making English courts the popular choice for 
commercial litigants including the use of choice of court clauses and enforceability of judgments 
in foreign jurisdictions.53  
The negative impact to the UK jurisdiction agreement may be minimised by the international 
framework of the Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005, which provides obligations for its 
Contracting States to respect agreements choosing the court of other Contracting States,54 and it 
binds all EU Member States apart from Denmark. However, since the UK does not ratify the 
Convention as an independent country, this Convention would not immediately bind the UK on 
the exiting date. It is very likely that the UK will sign and ratify the Convention anyway after 
Brexit, but uncertainty may continue to exist after Brexit and before the Convention finally 
enters into effect in the UK. Pursuant to Article 31 of the Hague Convention, it shall enter into 
force on the first day of the month following the expiration of three months after the deposit of 
the second instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.55  From the perspective 
of the EU law, the UK cannot ratify the Hague Convention before it withdraws from the EU. 
Even if the UK immediately deposits the document for ratification on the day of withdrawal, 
there will be a three-month gap before the Convention eventually enters into effect in the UK. 
                                                          
50The court of an EU Member State generally is not allowed to review jurisdiction in recognition and enforcement of 
judgments rendered by the court of other EU Member States. See Art 45(3) of the Brussels I Recast. Limited 
exceptions are granted to protection jurisdiction in employment, insurance and consumer contracts (Art 45(1)(e)). 
But even in these types of contracts, the finding of the fact on which jurisdiction is grounded cannot be examined 
(Art 45(2)). 
51 For the effect on the English jurisdiction agreements, see Mukarrum Ahmed, ‘Brexit and English Jurisdiction 
Agreements’, (2016) 27 European Business Law Review 989; Mukarrum Ahmed, Paul Beaumont, ‘Exclusive 
Choice of Court Agreements’, (2017) 13 J. Priv. IntL. 386.  
52 Bar Council (England and Wales), ‘The Brexit Papers: Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Paper 4)’, para 9, 
https://www.barcouncil.org.uk/media/557742/paper_4_civil_jurisdiction_and_judgments.pdf (last accessed 13 Dec 
2017).  
53 E Lein, R McCorquodale, et al., ‘Factors Influencing International Litigants’ Decision to Bring Commercial 
Claims to the London Based Courts’, para 4.3, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/396343/factors-influencing-
international-litigants-with-commercial-claims.pdf (last access 13 Dec 2017). 
54 Hague Choice of Court Convention, Arts 5 and 6. For more discussion of the international convention, see sec.VI 
below. 
55 Art 31. 
  
Given the future uncertainty, skillful lawyers may advise their clients to avoid inserting the 
exclusive choice of the UK jurisdiction clauses into their contracts from now on, which may 
result in long-term consequences, especially where companies do not frequently review and 
revise their standard terms and conditions including jurisdiction clauses. This problem may be 
addressed in two ways. Ideally, the UK-EU deal on the transitional period might enable the 
continued application of the Hague Choice of Court Convention between the UK and other 
Contracting States after Brexit and before the Convention enters into effect in the UK as an 
independent signatory, as far as this arrangement is accepted by the Hague Conference. In case 
such a transitional deal cannot be reached, the UK is arguably not prevented from acceding to the 
Hague Convention in its own right before Brexit under international law. It is debatable whether 
it is in the best interest of the UK, in a hard Brexit scenario, to breach the EU law by ratifying the 
Hague Convention a few months before the exit date when it is still a Member State. This 
strategy could provide a seamless coverage to protect the UK choice of court agreement and the 
UK litigation market.  
The UK Government is aware of the reciprocity challenge. In its White Paper, the UK 
Government states that 
‘In some cases EU law is based on reciprocal arrangements, with all member states 
treating certain situations in the same way. If such reciprocal arrangements are not 
secured as a part of our new relationship with the EU, it may not be in the national 
interest, or workable, to continue to operate those arrangements alone.’56 
However, the White Paper proposes the delegated powers to correct the relevant EU rules to 
prevent the reciprocal rules become one-sided.57 In other words, it will only delete the relevant 
EU rules based on reciprocity to remove the unilateral obligations from the UK but it does not 
suggest how to maintain the current, or establish new, reciprocal obligations between the UK and 
EU Member States.  
 
                                                          
56 White Paper, n.18, para 3.3. 
57White Paper, ibid., para 3.7-3.15. 
  
III. MULTILATERAL MODEL 
Since the transposition model could not reserve the important reciprocal feature of the EU 
private international law, the multilateral model is deemed a promising alternative by 
commentators.58 It requires the UK and EU negotiate an international treaty for the post-Brexit 
UK-EU civil justice cooperation. Such an agreement can be formed in a number of different 
ways. It could mirror the EU-Denmark arrangement in relation to the EU judgment scheme, or 
could rely on the existing Lugano II Convention. Or it could be a fresh new treaty designed 
specifically for the EU-UK judicial cooperation post Brexit.  
 
A. Denmark model 
This model mirrors the EU-Denmark Agreement to apply the Brussels I Regulation to civil and 
commercial judicial cooperation between Denmark and EU Member States.59 Denmark is an EU 
Member State, but it has opted out from the EU law of justice, including judicial cooperation.60 
In 2005, Denmark and the EU entered into the EU-Denmark Agreement, which implements the 
Brussels I Regulation to the relationship between Denmark and EU Member States. This 
Agreement is international law in nature, instead of EU law. Therefore, in principle, the UK and 
EU could follow this model after Brexit. Furthermore, it also provides flexibility to Denmark 
concerning the future amendment and changes to the Brussels I Regulation. Although Denmark 
cannot participate in amending the Regulation, any amendments will not apply in Denmark,61 
unless Denmark decides to adopt such amendments by notifying the Commission of its 
                                                          
58S Masters, n 15 above, 484. See also the oral evidence by Prof Jonathan Harris QC to the House of Lords, ‘Brexit: 
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decision.62 The Danish notification creates mutual obligations under international law between 
Denmark and the Community and amends and updates the Agreement accordingly.63 After the 
EU adopted the Brussels I Recast that updates the Brussels I Regulation, Denmark notified the 
European Commission of its decision to implement the Recast Regulation on 20 December 
2012.64 
This level of cooperation and flexibility may be favoured by the UK. However, it is crucial to 
understand the difficulty in adopting this model. Firstly, the situation of the UK and Denmark is 
different. Denmark is an EU Member State but acquires the exemption from the EU constitution. 
The EU has the interest for the coherent and consistent application of law within the EU member 
states to improve integration and shared common values within the Union. 65  After the UK 
withdraws from the EU, the UK is no longer a Member State and its situation is  not comparable 
to Denmark. Furthermore, the European Commission also emphasised that direct extension of 
the effect of the Brussels I Regulation to Denmark is ‘of an exceptional nature’ and would be 
applied ‘for a transitional period only’. 66 It suggests that the EU has the intention to encourage 
Denmark to fully take part in the EU justice scheme in the future and limit the use of this model. 
It would be contrary to the general EU policy to utilize this model easily for a third country. 
Secondly, the alleged ‘flexibility’ to opt in to the amended EU law is not realistic. The 
amendment of EU law usually would repeal the old law, which no longer exists in operation after 
the new law being effective.67 According to the EU-Denmark Agreement, if the EU has adopted 
the amendments, the Agreement that extends the effect of the old EU law to Denmark would 
terminate after 30 days of adoption.68 In other words, the EU could unilaterally decide to amend 
the EU law without Denmark’s contribution and Denmark has to opt in to the amended scheme 
to keep the cooperative relationship ongoing.  
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Thirdly, conflicts may also arise as to the enforcement of the special arrangement treaty. If 
disputes arise between EU and Denmark on the non-compliance under the EU-Denmark 
Agreement, the EU could bring this dispute before the CJEU against Denmark,69 while Denmark 
may complain about the non-compliance of a Member State before the EU. 70  This dispute 
resolution mechanism follows the one set up in the TFEU,71 because it adjudicates disputes 
between the EU and a Member State. After the UK becomes a third country, it is hard to justify 
adopting the same dispute resolution scheme to enforce the special arrangement agreement. 
Furthermore, the EU-Denmark Agreement requires the Danish court to refer cases to the CJEU 
in questions on validity or interpretation of this Agreement.72 Reserving the interpretation power 
of the CJEU may not be easily acceptable by the UK because the judicial cooperation agreement 
is not EU law, but an international treaty, which establishes treaty obligations for the UK and EU 
as parties of equal status.73  The UK government has emphasised that it is the international 
custom that ‘the courts of one party are not given direct jurisdiction over the other in order to 
resolve disputes between them’.74  
Fourthly, this model may also affect the UK’s power to enter into other international judicial 
cooperation agreements. For example, the EU-Denmark Agreement provides that although 
international agreements entered into by the EU based on Brussels I will not bind Denmark,75  
Denmark is also prevented from entering into international agreements that may affect or alter 
the scope of Brussels I unless satisfactory arrangements have been made regarding the 
relationship between this special agreement and the international agreement in question.76 If the 
UK concludes the similar Agreement with the EU and wants to enter into other global private 
international law frameworks or conclude international judicial cooperation arrangements with 
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any non-EU countries in the future, the UK can only enter into these Conventions after making 
arrangements with the EU first. Furthermore, Denmark is obliged to coordinate with the EU in 
negotiating any international agreements that may affect Brussels I, and cannot conduct any 
actions that would jeopardize the objectives of the EU in its sphere of competence in such 
negotiations.77 This type of obligation may be more easily acceptable by the Member States of 
the EU than a third country that is not bound by the EU legislative competence and only wishes 
to participate in the judicial cooperation in the single market.  
 
B. Lugano II model 
The EU has made special judicial cooperation arrangement with non-EU Member States. A 
typical example is the Lugano Convention 2007 (Lugano II), which applies between the EU and 
Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. Article 70 of the Lugano II clearly states that this Convention 
is open for accession by Members of the EFTA, EU Member States acting on behalf of certain 
non-EU territories, and third states.78  It means the UK could accede to Lugano II even without 
becoming an EU or EFTA Member. All Contracting Parties shall ‘pay due account to the 
principles laid down by any relevant decision concerning the provision(s) concerned or any 
similar provision(s) of the 1988 Lugano Convention and the instruments referred to in Article 
64(1) of the Convention rendered by the courts of the States bound by this Convention and by 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities.’79 It is important to note that this article 
requires not only that CJEU decisions, but also the judgments of the courts of other Contracting 
States on relevant provisions in the Brussels and Lugano family, should be respected. This 
requirement would not impose any problem from the perspective of the UK. This indirect 
jurisdiction of CJEU will be more easily accepted by the UK. More importantly, the enforcement 
role of this Convention is dedicated to a ‘Standing Committee’.80 This Standing Committee will 
take the general management and monitoring role, including a consultation on the relationship 
between this Convention and other international instruments, accession of new states, revision 
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and amendment of this Convention and withdrawal of any reservations and declarations.81 These 
arrangements would achieve a proper balance between the UK government’s position to take 
over the legal supremacy and the practical necessity to maintain consistency in applying the EU 
private international law rules.  
There are, of course, a few conditions attached to this option. Basically, the UK should provide 
the Depositary with information on its judicial system, internal law on civil procedure and 
enforcement of judgments and its private international law relating to civil procedure.82 This 
requirement may not generate too many problems. The real problem is that a third country will 
only be invited to accede if it has received the unanimous consent of the Contracting Parties.83  
This requirement generates two potential difficulties. Firstly, it may cause delay. It may take up 
to one year after the notification by the Depositary for the Contracting Parties to respond.84 
Furthermore, even if such unanimous consent is given by all Contracting Parties at the end of a 
year, the Convention will enter into force on the first day of the third month following the 
deposit of the instrument of accession.85 It means even if the UK applied to accede to Lugano II 
on the first day of leaving the EU, there will be a 14 months gap before the Convention enters 
into force, causing uncertainty in the transition period, unless the transitional deal includes the 
continued operation of the Lugano Convention between the UK and the non-EU Contracting 
States by treating the UK as still an EU member for this purpose during the transitional period 
until the UK is accepted as an independent party to Lugano II, as long as Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland accept this transitional arrangement. Secondly, the EU may not give consent for the 
UK’s accession. The diversity of civil and common procedural law and legal culture, plus the 
lack of CJEU interpretive power, could lead to diverse interpretations and implementation of this 
Convention between the UK and other EU Member States.86 The EU has shown the tendency of 
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being increasingly tough in preserving the CJEU jurisdiction in interpreting international 
conventions involving EU law elements.87   
Besides, the quality of the Convention rules could constitute another challenge. Lugano II has 
been largely updated in contrast to the Lugano Convention 1988; it is based on the Brussels I 
Regulation (44/2001). It is necessary to note that the Brussels I Regulation was updated by the 
Brussels I Recast and the latest version has addressed a number of problems that are considered 
important by UK practitioners. For example, under the Brussels I Regulation, the CJEU strictly 
enforces the lis pendens rule by requiring the second seized court to stay jurisdiction in favour of 
the first seized court, even if the court second seized is chosen by the parties in an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause.88 This approach has been criticized by most commentators and practitioners 
as it undermines the importance of party autonomy and it would generate incentives of abuse and 
the ‘torpedo’ action.89 This decision may also show the different legal philosophy between civil 
law tradition that focuses more on certainty and regulation and common law tradition that 
focuses on liberalism and party autonomy.90  Therefore, the revision made in the Brussels I 
Recast that eventually prioritizes the choice of court agreement over the lis pendens rule is 
strongly supported by UK stakeholders,91 but this benefit will be lost by adopting the Lugano II 
model.  
The Brussels I Recast has made other reforms, such as the abolition of exequatur,92 the rules to 
prevent concurrent proceedings between EU and non-EU states,93 allowing EU consumers to 
take advantage of the protective jurisdiction to sue a third country defendant in the consumer’s 
domicile,94 and clarification of the relationship between arbitration and the Brussels I Recast.95  
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They are, however, less important in the interest of the UK. Although the UK government and 
stakeholders generally support those changes they were not a high priority for the UK apart from 
the clarifications in relation to arbitration and delaing with concurrent proceedings with courts 
outside the EU. For example, the UK government stated that the existence of exequatur did not 
create significant practical problems for litigants and safeguards should remain even if exequatur 
was indeed abolished.96  The reform in relation to arbitral matters may appear too conservative 
and incomplete in contrast to the approach preferred by the UK but it is certainly better than the 
Brussels I Regulation position reflected in Lugano II.97 The other reforms were rarely discussed 
or generated too much debate in the UK. It is likely that accession to the Lugano II may only 
raise serious problems on the priority status to the choice of court agreement versus lis pendens.  
 
C. Unprecedented new arrangement—the UK model 
The third potential multilateral solution is a special new arrangement between the UK and EU. 
This model has been favoured by some academic commentators and government alike.98 The UK 
Government has published ‘A Future Partnership Paper’ in 2017, which outlines the support for 
the ‘UK Model’. The UK Government will seek ‘a deep and special partnership’ with the EU 
which reflects the close existing relationship between the two sides and ‘reflects closely the 
substantive principles of cooperation under the current EU framework’.99 However, it does not 
provide more details as to how the partnership can be formed. Based on the above analysis, it is 
suggested that the EU-UK arrangement could follow the Lugano II model, being the 
international convention version of the existing EU law.100  
However, the success of the ‘UK model’ depends on the cooperation and support of all EU 
Member States. Negotiating the judicial cooperation deal with the UK is not considered one of 
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the priorities either in the EU policy in general, or in the EU agenda in respect of the UK. The 
EU has more important and urgent matters to deal with first. Although the EU negotiation 
directive published on 22 May 2017 suggests that judicial cooperation should be clarified in the 
Article 50 Agreement, it is limited to ongoing proceedings excluding proceedings commenced 
after the withdrawal date.101 However, it does not mean the EU definitely has no intention to 
enter into a long-term partnership agreement with the post-Brexit UK. The EU has confirmed its 
wish to have the UK as a close partner in the future, but this matter is not prioritized in the 
current stage of negotiation.102 Furthermore, if the UK is out of the EU judicial cooperation 
system, the traditional common law instrument anti-suit injunction, which could restrain parties 
from suing in the courts of other EU Member States, would revive.103 Anti-suit injunctions 
would indirectly affect jurisdiction of EU Member States and affect the coherent application of 
the EU jurisdiction rules.104 It is likely that the UK would trade anti-suit injunction for a judicial 
cooperation agreement.  
The real difficulty of the UK model is the status of the CJEU. Since the UK model proposes 
converting the EU law into an international convention, the EU would not allow the same EU 
law provisions enforced in a way different from the CJEU interpretation applied between EU 
Member States.105 The ‘soft’ role of CJEU as adopted in the Lugano II may not be accepted by 
the EU for two reasons. Firstly, although Protocol No 2 of the Lugano II clearly states the 
principle of the uniform interpretation ‘to prevent, in full deference to the independence of the 
courts, divergent interpretations and to arrive at an interpretation as uniform as possible’ between 
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the Lugano II and the CJEU interpretation of the Brussels I, 106 the provision only requires the 
Contracting Parties to ‘pay due account’ to the CJEU rulings without imposing more restrictive 
obligations. It has been criticised by one commentator that such wording is too soft and 
insufficient to achieve the objective in Protocol 2;107 that the case law of the non-EU Contracting 
Parties, such as Switzerland, shows that their courts might have deviated from the CJEU 
judgments too readily108 and that the risk of divergent interpretations may be higher in the post-
Brexit UK due to the different legal culture and tradition between civil and common law 
countries.109 Whether this analysis is fair or not the EU has shown a desire to preserve the 
competence of the CJEU in the Brexit negotiation.110    
From the perspective of the UK, however, the judicial cooperation agreement is not EU law, but 
an international treaty, which establishes treaty obligations for the UK and EU as parties of equal 
status.111 There is no supremacy between the UK and the EU. The interpretation of the treaty is 
subject to international law and principles on treaty interpretation. 112  Furthermore, it is the 
international custom that ‘the courts of one party are not given direct jurisdiction over the other 
in order to resolve disputes between them’.113 Granting direct jurisdiction to the CJEU would be 
a red-line for the UK.  
It is suggested that an innovative intermediate approach may help in resolving the dilemma. 
Since the proposed EU-UK arrangement applies the same EU law to the UK, it is practically 
necessary to maintain consistency in the application of the EU law to all countries to maintain 
certainty. 114  Although the EU-UK agreement is international law, instead of EU law, it is 
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originated from relevant EU private international law Regulations and its interpretation requires 
taking into account of the legislative purpose and backgrounds of those Regulations, and the 
CJEU is the most competent international entity to consistently interpret EU private international 
law. In other words, if the UK intends to apply the same EU private international law rules to 
maintain certainty for the UK-EU relationship, it will accept these rules to be interpreted 
consistently within and out of the EU. From the perspective of the EU, the main purpose of 
preserving jurisdiction of CJEU is to protect autonomy and consistent implementation of the EU 
law internally and externally.115 Thus, the functioning is more important than the status. An 
arrangement that could both maintain the independence of the UK courts and effectively protect 
consistent interpretation of EU law might be accepted by both sides. The proposed EU-UK 
Agreement might include a provision that imposes on the Contracting Parties the treaty 
obligation to closely follow the CJEU judgments and only deviate in exceptional circumstances 
where the case law concerned relies on a concept of general EU law which is not expected to 
affect a third country. The Contracting Party is also required to highlight and justify any 
deviation. Although this approach requires the UK to closely follow the CJEU decisions, it does 
not submit the UK to the supremacy of CJEU. Furthermore, exemption from the general duty is 
still allowed in exceptional circumstances. Hopefully, this intermediate approach may help both 
sides to reach a compromise. 
A relevant but different matter is the dispute resolution and enforcement of the proposed 
agreement. Since the UK is given the autonomy to deviate from the CJEU judgments, disputes 
may arise between the EU and the UK as to whether a particular deviation is permitted or 
amounts to a breach. However, the CJEU, as the internal judiciary of the EU, is not appropriate 
in resolving the enforcement dispute between the contracting states. A neutral, third entity, such 
as a joint committee, arbitral tribunal or a specially designed supranational court, should take on 
the dispute resolution role. 116  Since the EU has already shown dissatisfaction of a joint 
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committee,117 and the designation of a supranational court simply to resolve EU-UK judicial 
cooperation disputes may prove inefficient, 118  the most pragmatic approach probably is 
arbitration.  Anyway, whichever entity has been chosen, it is necessary to ascertain that it will 
not open a legal back door to CJEU jurisdiction. For example, it should not include a term 
requiring the third entity to refer to the CJEU for a binding decision as is provided in the EU 
agreements with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.119  
 
IV. BILATERAL MODEL 
The bilateral model suggests that the UK enters into multiple bilateral judicial cooperation 
treaties with individual EU Member States.120 The UK may not acquire the same reciprocal 
treatment and cooperation with all 27 Member States, but some of them. However, it allows the 
UK to choose the appropriate partners to conclude the justice cooperation treaties. The term of 
the agreement can also be altered according to the interaction between the UK and different 
partners and the different needs and situation of every relevant country. The parties are free to 
decide whether the current version of the EU private international law should be adopted, 
whether they should enter into a single agreement on recognition and enforcement rules, or 
whether they should conclude completely different rules on judicial cooperation. 
The greatest challenge to the bilateral model, apart from being a piecemeal solution, is the 
competence of the Member States in entering into such an agreement. According to Article 81 of 
the TFEU, the EU has the competence to develop judicial cooperation in civil and commercial 
matters with cross-border implications, particularly when it is necessary for the proper 
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functioning of the internal market.121 Since the EU legislation on civil and commercial judicial 
cooperation exists, the EU has the external competence to conclude international treaties as a 
single unit in areas covered by EU legislation to make sure that the international treaties would 
not affect or alter the operation of the EU law.122 In Opinion 1/03, the CJEU ruled that such 
exclusive external competence exists as far as the conclusion of an international agreement is 
‘capable’ of affecting the EU law,123 and it is not necessary for the scope of the international 
treaty and the EU law to fully coincide.124 In particular, the EU law on judicial cooperation aims 
to establish a uniform system preventing concurrent proceedings and enabling free circulation of 
judgments, the purpose of which is deemed by the CJEU as being easily undermined if there is 
an international treaty with the same purpose entering into between a third country and the EU or 
any Member State.125 The exclusive external competence in relation to civil judicial cooperation 
was re-confirmed in Opinion 1/13, where the EU held exclusive competence to accept the 
accession of new non-EU contracting states to the Hague Child Abduction Convention.126  
The exclusive competence of the EU prevents individual Member States from entering into 
bilateral jurisdiction and enforcement agreements with the UK. However, arguably a bilateral 
agreement that does not concern court jurisdiction but only deals with mutual recognition and 
enforcement of judgments between an EU Member State and a third country may not fall within 
the exclusive competence of the EU. The Brussels scheme only addresses recognition and 
enforcement of judgments between EU Member States and leaves every Member State to decide 
whether to recognise and enforce judgments rendered by a non-EU country. Since this matter is 
excluded from EU law, a Member State is free to legislate or amend its domestic law on non-EU 
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judgment enforcement. 127 A Member State could unilaterally enact its domestic law to enforce a 
particular non-Member State’s judgment, which arguably has the same effect as if this Member 
State concludes a convention with a non-EU country to reciprocally recognise and enforce each 
other’s judgments. Such a convention would not affect the ‘scope’ of this Member State or other 
Member States’ power under the Brussels scheme.  
The only argument that may prevent Member States from entering into a judgment-only bilateral 
treaty with a third country is that the Brussels I Recast includes discretionary lis pendens rules 
dealing with concurrent proceedings in a Member State and a third country.128 The conditions to 
exercise the discretion include that the judgment of the third country is expected to be ‘capable 
of recognition and…enforcement’ in the Member State and the stay is necessary for the proper 
administration of justice.129 A bilateral judgment-only convention that allows the Member State 
to enforce a third country judgment would affect the implementation of Articles 33 and 34 of the 
Brussels I Recast to a certain extent.130 If this argument is accepted, individual Member States 
are prohibited from entering into any bilateral judicial cooperation treaties, including judgment-
only treaties, with the UK. 
 
V. INTERNATIONAL MODEL 
One promising option is to urge the UK to cast its focus on the whole world and to explore 
opportunities at the international level. The Hague Conference on Private International Law, 
UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), for example, 
have established international frameworks facilitating civil and commercial judicial cooperation 
at different levels. The international judicial cooperation might bring the UK more benefits 
because it involves more contracting parties worldwide, including other major markets and trade 
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partners outside of EU, such as the US and China, and countries with historic links with the UK, 
such as commonwealth countries. 
Existing international conventions may reduce the negative impact and uncertainty brought by 
Brexit. The UK has been active in the Hague Conference on Private International Law and 
UNCITRAL in the past, and is a Contracting Party to five Hague judicial cooperation 
conventions.131 Continuous enforcement of these conventions will reduce the uncertainty caused 
by the termination of relevant EU instruments in the UK.132For example, the Protection of 
Children and Child Abduction Conventions may largely fill the gap left by the Brussels II bis.133 
It is even argued by some commentators that the original Hague Conventions have some 
advantages over the EU versions.134 For example, the EU override return order issued by the 
abducted child’s previous habitual residence is an ineffective and redundant procedure according 
to empirical data; the effective provisional measures in the Protection of Children Convention 
are not available in the Brussels II bis; and the rules on transfer of cases in relation to parental 
responsibilities are more flexible in the Hague Protection of Children Convention than the 
Brussels II bis.135 
There are also international conventions which apply in the UK by virtue of its EU membership, 
including the Hague Maintenance Convention,136 and Hague Choice of Court Convention. It has 
already been discussed above that one feasible approach for the UK is to enter into the Hague 
Choice of Court Convention as an independent state.137 This could ease the uncertainty caused 
by Brexit at least where an exclusive choice of English court agreement is concluded. The Hague 
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Choice of Court Convention is ratified by the EU, Mexico and Singapore, and signed by China, 
Montenegro, Ukraine and USA,138 which provides even a broader territorial coverage than the 
EU law. It is likely that more countries may ratify this Convention in the future.139  
However, there are also a few limitations of the international approach. Firstly, the Hague 
Choice of Court Convention only applies to cases with exclusive jurisdiction clauses and it 
excludes some important civil and commercial matters out of its scope.140 Ratifying the Hague 
Convention will only partially resolve the judicial cooperation difficulty that the UK may face 
after Brexit. The Hague Conference has continued the judgment project with the purpose to 
adopt a more comprehensive framework for civil and commercial judicial cooperation in the 
future.141 However, this will take time before the convention is finally adopted and it takes 
longer for countries to ratify.142 Furthermore, judicial cooperation at the international level is not 
as advanced as at the EU level, which is reflected in the quality of the provisions; the scope of 
the harmonization; the extent of the cooperation; the gaps left for domestic law; and broad 
reservations that are made available. For example, the Hague Choice of Court Convention has 
provided more grounds for the court of a Contracting State to refuse recognising and enforcing 
foreign judgments; 143  there is more leeway for a non-chosen court to take jurisdiction 
irrespective of a choice of court agreement; 144  and more reservations are available for a 
Contracting State to further limit the effect of the Hague Convention in its courts. 145  It is 
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reasonable to predict that even if the final Hague judgment project is successful and a more full-
range judgments convention is adopted, limitations and reservations to a similar extent may also 
exist. Thirdly, the Hague Choice of Court Convention does not directly address jurisdiction on 
preliminary matters of a choice of court clause and it is possible that sometimes concurrent 
proceedings would exist in deciding on the validity of a choice of court clause, resulting in 
conflicting rulings, followed by concurrent proceedings on the substantive matters, and potential 
conflicting judgments on the substance. Fourthly, the Hague Choice of Court Convention does 
not improve the efficiency of the procedure for recognition and enforcement of judgments. It 
only states that the court should act ‘expeditiously’, which is rather a vague requirement.146 
There is no minimum standard or harmonization of the refusal procedure. In contrast, the 
Brussels I Recast has abolished exequatur and partially streamlined the recognition and 
enforcement procedure,147 which brings speed and efficiency in cross-border enforcement. These 
weaknesses cannot be improved by the UK alone and the UK can only benefit and fully utilise 
the international model if the overall international framework is improved.  
 
VI. UNILATERAL MODEL 
The unilateral model is the default position where traditional domestic laws of the UK and EU 
Member States are applied by their respective courts to determine EU-UK judicial cooperation. 
Some commentators suggest that returning to the traditional English law could be enough to deal 
with the uncertainty immediately post-Brexit, at least for a short term.148 The main argument is 
that while concluding the new partnership agreement with the EU is likely to cause delay, it is 
necessary to have something to fill this gap. And since the transposition approach could not work 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
rendered by a chosen court if all factors other than the choice of court clause locate in the requested country (Art 20); 
this Convention does not apply to certain matters (Art 21). 
146 Art 16. Beaumont and Walker, n.143, 60. 
147 Brussels I Recast, Recital 2, and Article 36. 
148 See the oral evidence given by Prof Richard Fentiman and Dr Louis Merrett to the House of Lord, Select 
Committee on the European Union, Justice Sub-Committee, ‘Corrected oral evidence: Brexit: civil justice 
cooperation and the CJEU’, 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-justice-
subcommittee/brexit-civil-justice-cooperation/oral/44259.html (accessed on 10 Oct 2017); See also HL paper 134, 
n.4, para 106. Professor Fentiman and Dr Merrett believed the a special arrangement with the EU is an optimal 
choice for a long run, but for the short term, without such an arrangement in place, it is not necessary in transpose 
the EU law into the UK law, but could simply rely on the common law rules. 
  
on a reciprocal basis, it is better to rely on traditional common law for the time being until a 
partnership arrangement enters into force.149  
However, returning to the common law is likely to cause uncertainty. 150  The EU private 
international law provides consistency in that the same rules are adopted to decide jurisdiction 
and governing law of cross-border disputes that fall within the EU scheme. The cross-border 
players within the EU do not need to study the domestic conflict of laws of different Member 
States to assess their rights, obligations and commercial risks arising out of cross-border 
activities. Retrieving the common law will increase the cost of learning, especially for the parties 
who have already engaged in activities between the EU and the UK, who will have to reassess 
the risk and cost upon the change of law. Secondly, the quality of some common law rules, 
especially choice of law rules, are subject to criticism.151 The common law choice of law rules in 
contract are unclear as to how the putative proper law is decided and it does not include any 
particular mechanisms to protect the weaker party in a contract. The tort conflicts rules in the 
Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 are also cricitised for being 
uncertain in how the lex loci delicti is determined in complicated cases where tort occurs in 
multiple countries,152 when the general rule should be displaced, whether party autonomy is 
accepted, and the complicated distinction between substance and procedure in damages. 153  
Traditional jurisdiction rules are better in terms of quality, as they have been applied for a long 
time and still in use after the UK acceded to the Brussels regime for non-EU related cases,154 
except the EU stakeholders may argue the discretion based system uncertain. Thirdly, the 
unilateral model cannot resolve the problem of judgment recognition and respect of jurisdiction 
                                                          
149 See Fentiman and Merrett, ibid. 
150 See comments from Rt Hon Sir Richard Aikens, Richard Lord QC, Oliver Jones, David Greene, and Hugh 
Mercer, HL paper 134, n.4, para 107-112. 
151 A Briggs, ‘Secession from the European Union and Private International Law’, (written evidence to the HOL, 
CJC0002), para 14-21. 
152 B Rodger, ‘Ascertaining the Statutory Lex Loci Delicti’, (1998) 47 ICLQ 205. 
153 Harding v Wealands [2006] UKHL 32. 
154  P Rogerson, ‘After Brexit: Is International Commercial Litigation in London Doomed?’, 
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/266692/Rogerson-on-BREXIT-for-NLJ.pdf?sequence=1 
(accessed on 21.03.18). 
  
clauses. The pure unilateral model is thus doubted by most commentators155 and not likely to be 
the UK government’s position.156 The unilateral model, if adopted, would certainly be combined 
with international conventions. However, this approach could not provide the UK the same level 
of cooperation with other EU member states as the Lugano II model or the UK model. The limits 
of international conventions as analysed above will also remain. Finally, not all EU private 
international law rules are reciprocity based. Some rules, such as most choice of law rules and 
some jurisdiction rules, are unilaterally applicable. They could be transposed into the UK 
domestic law without causing a lot of problems. As to these rules, the transposition model would 




The above analysis suggests that three models are promising: the UK model, the Lugano II 
model and the combination of transposition model with international model. From the pragmatic 
perspective, the UK model, which supports the conclusion of a new EU-UK convention on 
judicial cooperation, would be the best choice. Stakeholders want certainty and they wish their 
previous negotiated agreements or existing legal relationship to be governed by the similar 
framework. Certainty requires continuity of the current judicial cooperation scheme after the 
withdrawal date, or at least to keep the reciprocal cooperation at the similar extent. The UK 
model could achieve the wanted certainty for business practitioners. In terms of quality, the UK 
model implements the same EU law in the new EU-UK convention, which provides more 
comprehensive rules and more effective cooperation than current international conventions.  
The UK model, of course, has some weaknesses. The first is the uncertainty as to whether such 
an agreement could ever be made, especially the EU has not shown clear sign of the same level 
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of desire as the UK government.157 However, given the close civil and commercial link between 
the UK and other EU Member States in the past few decades maintaining the current cooperation 
would provide certainty to and meet the common interest of both sides.158 The second difficulty 
is the position of the CJEU, which is likely to generate disagreements if the EU wants to preserve 
its direct jurisdiction which is deemed a red line by the UK. However, this article suggests that 
an intermediate approach may work, which requires the UK to closely follow the CJEU 
interpretation and only allows deviation in exceptional circumstances with sufficient 
justification.159 Although this suggestion subjects the UK to the CJEU indirect jurisdiction, this 
compromise is a necessary price for the exchange of commercial certainty. The third shortfall is 
the time frame. The special arrangements may take time to negotiate and conclude. It is thus 
necessary to take other approaches to fill this gap. Finally, the current EU private international 
law is not perfect, for example, some EU family law provisions may not work as effectively as 
their international counterparts,160 and the EU rules dealing with third countries are generally 
weak.161  
The Lugano II model may be a relatively straightforward and simple way. However, it is inferior 
to the UK model in that, firstly, the Lugano II sacrifices some improvements that the UK would 
like to keep, and secondly, the Lugano II is limited in its scope.162 More importantly, there is an 
uncertainty as to whether the EU would be happy to accept the accession of the UK, given the 
‘soft’ role that the CJEU has played and the fear of diverse interpretation.163  
The transposition model cannot work alone and its adoption must be combined with the 
international model to compensate the cooperation gap that a unilateral approach lacks. The 
advantage of this approach is the flexibility and freedom to the UK and there is no compromise 
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to the CJEU jurisdiction. However, the current international framework does not provide the 
same level of intensive cooperation or the comprehensive coverage as the EU law. There will 
also be greater risk of inconsistent implementation of the convention rules by the courts of 
different contracting states, causing uncertainty to stakeholders. It is thus argued that the 
transposition plus international model would be a backup approach if no special arrangement can 
be reached due to the disagreement on CJEU jurisdiction. Furthermore, it could also play the 
gap-filling role if the EU-UK arrangement cannot be finalised in a short time. As to international 
conventions that apply to the UK by virtue of its EU membership, the UK has to follow a formal 
ratification process and it will take a few months for these conventions to take effect in the UK. 
The transitional period should enable a way to be found to have seamless application of those 
conventions to avoid any gap. In case a hard Brexit is inevitable, the UK perhaps needs to 
consider submitting the ratification while the UK is still governed by these conventions as a 
Member State of the EU to avoid any break in coverage.164 
Based on the above discussion, the optimal model is the UK model. If an EU-UK arrangement is 
possible, the UK should still ratify relevant international conventions to cover the gap before 
such an arrangement enters into effects and to assist judicial cooperation with non-EU countries. 
If such an arrangement is not achievable and a hard Brexit is inevitable, the UK could transpose 
the unilateral applicable EU law into its domestic law and to ratify relevant international 
conventions as a reliable alternative. It is thus suggested that the UK should establish a strategy 
to combine multiple models applicable in different circumstances: (1) during the Article 50 
negotiation, passing the Great Repeal Bill, which will become the Great Repeal Act and be 
effective on the exit date, to transpose choice of law rules and jurisdiction rules (removing the 
reciprocal part) into UK domestic law; (2) immediately after Brexit, negotiating with the EU for 
an international arrangement, or a few international treaties, that contain the reciprocal judicial 
cooperation rules mirroring the relevant provisions of the current EU instruments; (3) deposit the 
instruments of ratification or accession of the Hague 2005 and 2007 Conventions a few months 
before the date of withdrawal; (4) be more active in shaping and participating in future 
international judicial cooperation treaties post Brexit and ensure ratification of the new Hague 
Judgments Convention shortly after it is concluded in 2019.  
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